Admission to hospital is associated with significant risk of harm from mistakes made by healthcare professionals 1, 2 . While anaesthesia-related mortality appears low (2.79 deaths per million population per annum 3 ), risks of anaesthesia could be further reduced with an increased emphasis on quality. In a study of nearly 100,000 anaesthetics, an anaesthesia-related incident, event or complication was observed in 22% of patients 4 , and it appears that many of these occur-rences could be avoided by checking equipment 5, 6 . In the US, the UK and Australia, the anaesthesia care provider is responsible for checking equipment with peak accrediting bodies and manufacturers responsible for providing recommendations and guidelines on how this should be done, although there are several indicators that this is not being done well [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] .
In 1993, after studying several single-use breathing systems for use with artificial ventilation, the Emergency Care Research Institute recommended some simple checks to be performed whenever a new system is used 12 . In 2000, Emergency Care Research Institute reported the death of a patient because a disposable breathing system was not checked before use 13 . More recently in the UK, failing to check a breathing system before use led directly to the death of a child scheduled for minor surgery 14 . Near misses in Australia have led the Victorian Consultative SUMMARy Anaesthetists may subject patients to unnecessary risk by not checking anaesthetic equipment thoroughly before use. Numerous adverse events have been associated with failure to check equipment. The Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists and anaesthetic delivery system manufactures have made recommendations on how anaesthetic equipment should be maintained and checked before use and for the training required for staff who use such equipment. These recommendations are made to minimise the risk to patients undergoing anaesthesia.
This prospective audit investigated the adherence of anaesthetic practitioners to a selection of those recommendations. Covert observations of anaesthetic practitioners were made while they were checking their designated anaesthetic machine, either at the beginning of a day's list or between cases. Structured interviews with staff who check the anaesthetic machine were carried out to determine the training they had received. The results indicated poor compliance with recommendations: significantly, the backup oxygen cylinders' pressure/ contents were not checked in 45% of observations; the emergency ventilation device was not checked in 67% of observations; the breathing circuit was not tested between patients in 79% of observations; no documentation of the checks performed was done in any cases; and no assessment or accreditation of the staff who performed these checks was performed. It was concluded that the poor compliance was a system failing and that patient safety might be increased with training and accrediting staff responsible for checking equipment, documenting the checks performed, and the formulation and use of a checklist.
Council on Anaesthetic Mortality to reiterate the importance of checking breathing systems 15 .
The breathing system is just one part of the six basic subsystems in the modern anaesthetic delivery system (ADS). The change in terminology from anaesthesia machine to ADS reflects the transition of the apparatus from a relatively simple mechanical analogue device based on Boyle's adaption of Gwathmey's design 16 to a complex digitally-controlled unit. Manufacturers are expected to provide guidance on the checks of the ADS performed by technicians and clinicians before use, and the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists has produced a professional standard, PS31 Recommendations on Checking Anaesthesia Delivery Systems, that "... is intended to apply wherever anaesthesia is delivered" 17 19 ).
PS31 describes three levels of checks 17 : • level one check: this is a very detailed, complex function test prescribed by the manufacturer and is required for: -any new system, and -all systems after servicing. This should be performed by a trained service technician from the equipment provider or the Biomedical Engineering Department.
• level two check: this should be performed at the start of each anaesthesia session by the anaesthetist or an accredited person. • level three check: this should be performed immediately before commencing each anaesthetic by the anaesthetist.
In PS31, anaesthesia departments are responsible for defining minimum requirements for each check appropriate for the ADS in use, for training and accreditation of the personnel involved with each check and for attaching the checking protocol to each ADS 17 .
The aim of this audit was to generally ascertain compliance with current guidelines for the daily ADS check and the check prior to each patient. Training in checking and institutional support for checking was also investigated.
METHODS
Three observers conducted a prospective series of covert observations of level two and three ADS checks (PS31 17 ) performed by anaesthetists and trainees in the operating theatres at three hospitals in the southern region of Adelaide. Subsequent interviews with medical and nursing staff were conducted to ascertain what training they had received on checking equipment and the ADS were examined for attached checklists. This audit was approved by Flinders Clinical Research Ethics Committee (Application Number 049.11). Data on performance of checks was collected covertly to avoid any impact on behaviour. The focus was the level two and three checks described in PS31 17 . The level one check is performed by trained technical staff before an ADS is put into clinical service 17 . The level two check is the responsibility of the anaesthetist, but can be delegated to another staff member such as an anaesthetic nurse, and should be done at the beginning of an anaesthetic session 17 . The level three check is the responsibility of the anaesthetist and should be performed immediately before each anaesthetic 17 .
A representative sample of items in level two and three checks from the ADS manufacturers' manuals were identified for observation (Tables 1  and 2) 17, 20 .
Each ADS was examined for the presence of checklists and guidelines. Anaesthetic nurses and trainees were interviewed to assess the training they had received to check the ADS, both at the hospitals where they were currently working and elsewhere.
RESUlTS

Consultant/specialist anaesthetists and trainees
Forty-two level two and 66 level three checks by consultant/specialist anaesthetists (n=19) and trainees (n=5) were audited. In nearly half the level two checks (18/42), neither the backup oxygen cylinder nor the emergency ventilators were checked, and it was a specialist/consultant who made the majority of these omissions (16/18). On one occasion anaesthesia was commenced without a backup oxygen cylinder and on another occasion two caesarean sections were performed under neuraxial block without the ADS being checked by the anaesthetist.
Refilling of the anaesthetic agent cassette was observed 25 times. In approximately one-third of occasions (9/25), it was filled while docked in the ADS (i.e. in circuit), which is contrary to the manufacturers' advice.
Interviews with consultant/specialist anaesthetists and trainees
Anaesthetic trainees (n=5) had all received instruction on checking the ADS soon after commencing training, but there was much variability. For example, registrars reported the following:
• At one hospital a single session on checking the ADS and some troubleshooting was provided by technical staff. • On-the-job training provided by an anaesthetist or senior registrar that consisted of being shown how to check the ADS.
• Demonstration of the ability to carry out appropriate equipment checks, and detect and correct some simple equipment problems. • There was no formal assessment or accreditation in checking the ADS at any South Australian teaching hospital.
Support for practitioners
Most of the ADS (6/7) had a copy of the superseded Recommendations on Protocol for Checking the Anaesthesia Machine (1996) although all had a copy of the current PS31 (2003). All the ADS had an electronic checklist for testing, which is called a 'full system check'. At the hospitals studied, it is expected to be performed by an anaesthetic nurse, although some items were then changed after the checklist had been completed (e.g. scavenging turned on for the check was then turned off).
Twelve anaesthetic nurses and a clinical nurse consultant were interviewed. The training that anaesthetic nurses received for checking the ADS consisted of a session with technical staff and onthe-job training with a senior anaesthetic nurse. There was no central record of who had received training (including checking the ADS). None of the anaesthetic nurses interviewed reported having been assessed or accredited with respect to checking the ADS (0/12). The clinical nurse consultant in anaesthetics commented that there had been a drift in the ADS checking practices of junior and senior anaesthetic nurses.
DISCUSSION
Overall, it appears there is poor compliance with PS31 Recommendations on Checking Anaesthesia Delivery Systems 17 in the hospitals audited. The full system check that is relied on, usually performed daily on each ADS, is not comprehensive and even after it has been completed the ADS can fail to deliver oxygen 21 . level three checks are not routinely performed. Incomplete checking of the ADS is not just a local phenomenon but appears to be a widespread issue that erodes patient safety [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . Frequent noncompliance is indicative of a system failure rather than an accumulation of individual shortcomings 22 . The traditional response to poor compliance with a guideline has been to blame the individuals concerned, offer more education and issue edicts, but to be most effective a solution needs to be aimed at a system level. A requirement of PS31 is that performance of the level two check is documented 17 , but this does not seem to be assessed during Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists accreditation visits.
Although it has been assumed that consultant/ specialist anaesthetists can teach trainees to check the ADS and then assess their performance, several studies that have tested the ability of anaesthetists to detect preset faults in an ADS found that the proportion of faults detected to be in the range of 26-66% [23] [24] [25] . These seem to be poor results given that those being tested knew that faults would be present. In aviation, trainers are accredited for the training they provide. In checking the ADS there needs to be greater consistency in accreditation of trainees. Olympio and colleagues noted that anaesthetists who had already been trained to check the ADS displayed improved performance after intensive retraining 26 . If retraining improves the performance of those who check the ADS, then there needs to be more than a single training episode and it needs to be an ongoing requirement for anaesthesia practitioners. This raises questions such as how often anaesthetists should have recurrent ADS checking skills training and assessment; this should certainly be undertaken before anaesthetists have to use an unfamiliar ADS.
There are many examples of harm arising from events that could have been avoided had equipment been checked, and everyone agrees that a thorough check is important. Medical culture has been reported to affect the way doctors use guidelines, and even the layout of a guideline can affect its adoption; PS31 has been identified as having poor design 27 . A visual aid was shown to improve ADS check performance 28 but it was far from perfect and the authors concluded that improved methods of detecting faults were required.
Checklists to ensure safety-critical steps are widely used in other environments such as aviation. The 1935 crash of a prototype of the B17 Flying Fortress led to the widespread introduction of checklists by flight crews 29 . The crash was the result of a pilot, unfamiliar with the plane, attempting to take-off when the elevator lock, a recently introduced safety feature, had not been disengaged. The crash investigation concluded that the aircraft had become too complicated for all necessary procedures to be remembered and that pilots should use checklists for each stage of flight. All commercial aircraft operators now use the manufacturers' guidelines to develop checklists, the use of which has contributed to making aviation far safer than healthcare 30 .
A study of equipment problems during anaesthesia found that approximately 25% were due to human error, with nearly half related to failure to check 31 . A simulation-based study showed that a checklist reduced the number of items missed in preparing for obstetric anaesthesia 32 . Thomassen and colleagues found, over the study period, that there was a decrease in the number of missing items on the pre-induction checklist they developed, and a similar checklist to this could be used here 33 . A review of medical error arising from pressure to reduce turnover time in operating theatres (which would impact on the level three check) strongly supported the role of anaesthesia checklists in improving patient safety 34 .
Checks for apparently infrequent problems, such as blocked anaesthetic tubing 14, 35 , can seem unnecessary in daily practice and this can lead to complacency on the part of the institution and individuals. It has been suggested that anaesthetists believe their vigilance and monitoring will warn them of something wrong with the equipment 9 . Relying on monitoring this way reduces the margin of safety, and there is some evidence that high compliance with ADS checking may be a surrogate marker of maturity of a safety culture as it is associated with fewer adverse events from all causes 36 . The death of Tony Clowes, the nine-year-old who died due to a blocked patient breathing circuit 14 , showed that by the time monitors indicated a problem there was insufficient time to take remedial action before harm occurred. The publicity of the investigation into this death elicited a further 85 reports relating to blocked anaesthetic tubing in the UK 14 and similar cases have been reported in Australia 15 .
If hospital admission for surgery is to attain the six sigma level of safety recommended by the US Institutes of Health 37 , anaesthetists must routinely use checklists in their work. It is recognised that this could be threatening to some anaesthetists or considered intrusive, but patient safety must override personal preferences. The American Society of Anesthesiologists has published guidelines on developing ADS checklists 38 . The American Society of Anesthesiologists recommendations list three general considerations for the checklist: 1. outline the essential items that need to be available and functioning properly prior to delivering every anaesthetic, 2. identify the frequency with which each of the items needs to be checked, and 3. suggest which items may be checked by a qualified anaesthesia technician, biomedical technician or a manufacturer certified service technician. Organisational support for improving ADS checking could include completion of the level two check becoming a part of the theatre record, and a space for recording the level three check could be on the anaesthetic chart. This would indicate that the checks are recognised as important.
